The Falklands war raises many questions in context of political and strategic perceptions of the naval warfare. The war was the result of a long standing dispute of possession over the Falklands territories between Argentina and Britain. It provides an excellent example of use of force to gain strategic objectives. The Argentine attack on the Islands came as a surprise to all but the British forces were successful in quelling the advances of the Argentines through effective use of joint capabilities of naval power and air force. The amphibious operation illustrates the use of innovative technology in warfare to gain strategic advantage in military combats. The war emphasised the dominance of British powers in marine warfare. The assault marked a new victory for the Royal Navy forces but there were many lessons learnt from the war that formed the base for formulation of future British defence policies.
The Falklands campaign was a significant victory for the British forces and provided a chance to demonstrate its superior naval and air powers. The campaign also highlighted a new milestone in terms of use of joint capability of naval and air powers to ensure effective military operations. Many studies were undertaken to research the impact of this war on the subsequent defence policies and its implications on global warfare strategies. The Falklands War was an important watershed event that influenced subsequent British defence policy. Although its impact was not earth shattering, it nevertheless constituted a potent catalyst for change in some important aspects of the structure and emphasis in the nations defence policymaking. The Falklands War in the year 1982 triggered many distinctive changes in the defence policy of Britain. The essay focuses on the Falkland campaign and its subsequent impact on the defence policies of Britain. The subsequent sections analyse the outcomes of the war, the lessons learnt and the implications of these lessons on the defence strategies.
Campaign
Falkland Islands are separated from the Argentine mainland by only 400 miles to the Eastern coast. The distance from UK is about 8000 miles south-west. Early in the year 1690 British captain Strong landed on the islands and this was followed by the establishment of the British settlement in Falkland in the year 1776. The island was subject to several foreign invasions by France, Spain and US to be ultimately claimed as a British territory in the year 1833. Argentina laid claims on the territory on grounds of strategic interest. The island was located close to the Eastern coast of Argentina and possession of these territories would provide it with improved access to the mineral rich Antarctica in future. Oil was yet another resource that triggered Argentines interest in the islands in addition to providing an extended coastal dominance over regions of Cape Horn and Strait of Magellan. On the other hand British claimed that the people of Falkland were free and democratic gradually moving towards a system of self-governance under the British rule. The UK government emphasized that the island population wanted to remain under British dominance owing to the status quo provided by the existing governing authority. The political influences in Argentina led them to launch an attack on the Falkland territory in the year 1982. The military forces occupied the island territories despite UN resolution to withdraw forces immediately. The British responded with an aggressive campaign to ensure Argentines compliance with the UN sanctions to withdraw forces. The campaign focused on achieving this objective through UN diplomacy, economic sanctions or use of force as the last resort.
The British objectives behind the aggressive stance in the Falkland campaign were to assert its supremacy among the global powers and retain its dominance in colonial establishments. For the UK, the war was a tool of rational security policy it fought a national war over universal issues. Ignoring the attack on Falklands would have exposed its weakness in terms of economic and military capabilities. Moreover, both UK and Argentina had conflicting interests in Antarctica and a failure to react to the Argentine attack would have indicated the relinquishing of its stakes in the future developments of the continent. UK initiated moves to gain control over the island through means of political isolation, UN intervention and economic sanctions. However, when everything failed the only alternative left was to use military force.
The British operation in Falkland was carried out in three joint operation phases. The first phase of the operation was aimed at blocking Argentine Navy access to the islands through the use of nuclear submarines. In the second phase the British gained control and command over the sea and air operations that enabled them to recapture the islands through mounting amphibious landing operations. Argentina surrendered to the British on June 13 and this earmarked a new milestone in the history of naval warfare operations. The dismal performance of the Argentine troops in the war was attributed to various reasons ranging from poor planning, superior technology adopted by the opponents, and gross under-estimation of the British warfare tactics.
Joint capability status before the campaign
The end of the Cold War saw a new era in the European states that highlighted new challenges and threats to the political, social, and economic security. The Central and Eastern European states felt the need to design a framework to enable these states to coordinate their foreign policies and develop suitable measures to handle security issues. United Kingdom concentrated its efforts during this period on maintaining the freedom of its member states and expands its economic interests at various strategic locations across the globe. This goal was realized through its active participation in the formation and subsequent policies adopted by the European Union. Fundamental aspirations, and decisions about policy and posture, are framed in the light of the international environment and a nations sense of its place therein. The allocation of resources to military spending is decided on grounds of its significance in pursuing national interests and political economic gains. The interests of the British government lie in the expansion and protection of its settlements across the globe. The defence and security policies of the nation has emphasised the increasing need for maintaining a strong naval base. This is largely on account of the flexibility it affords, making it feasible to cope with whatever challenges may be presented in either the Eastern Atlantic or the more distant waters to which ships might be dispatched out of area contingency operations. Most of the European countries had inadequate naval infrastructure. The supremacy of the United Kingdom in the European integration since the historic times was based on the grounds of its well maintained and advanced naval base.
Prior to the Falklands campaign the British forces were actively engaged in forming strategic alliances for enhancing political, economic and social security through NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), EU (European Union) and OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). Both NATO and EU were effective in strengthening the position of the European States by consolidating democracy and ensuring stability from the Baltics to the Black Sea, they redrew the map of Europe. At the end of the Cold War, the OSCE played an active role in helping the European States to adopt democracy through its various regulatory bodies like the Secretariat in Vienna, Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw. The OSCE is more like a open forum where members can voice their concerns and opinions influencing policy decisions taken by the member countries since it does not have a legal binding on its members to abide by its resolution.
The NATO and the EU had been working together to meet the challenges posed to the European security. But this co-operation was bound by many conditions and pre-conditions that had led to conflicts between the associated member states and allies. A recent move by the EU was the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that was backed strongly by the United States with the pre-condition that this policy be tied to the NATO. The EU member states felt that both NATO and EU should work closely but support the ESDP since it provided the European member states to operate more autonomously in case of any crisis or conflicts without waiting for intervention or participation of the United States. During this phase there were very few military operations that were deployed outside Europe and this was a stark contrast to the conventional British Defence policy that laid increased emphasis of expeditionary warfare and extending its capabilities to operate from various geographic corners of the world.
The British defence policy during this phase focused more on naval and expeditionary forces. Conventional war tactics were applied to maintain political and military supremacy in the colonial territories. However, there were efforts to modernize the military capabilities through the acquisition of new technology and warfare equipment. Proposals were floated to improve amphibious operational capabilities that suffered setbacks in the pre-Falklands War period owing to budgetary constraints.
Use of Joint Capability during the Falkland Conflict
The Falklands campaign was a first in history owing to the use of missile technology in marine warfare. The objective of the war was limited to the assertion of political dominance over the islands of Falklands and this served to restrict the outcomes of the war in terms of territorial independence or autonomous control. The British possessed a distinctive advantage in terms of superior training and professionalism when it came to planning strategic moves and direction of the campaign. The communication between the campaign chiefs in London and generals at war front exhibited increased control over military affairs and aggressive moves. The moves were well planned, co-ordinated and executed with a precision that decided the outcome in their favour. On the other hand the level of control and command executed by the Argentines was not as effective. The strategic moves were ill-planned and this was evident in the level of mis-communication and mis-interpretation of statements during the war.
A primary contributor to the success of British forces was the adoption of high level of technology used during the warfare. The sea harriers out performed any other equipment during the course of aggression and this was demonstrated by the level of accuracy of attacks even in poor weather conditions. The use of missiles during the warfare was highly effective in destroying 8 Argentine aircrafts. During the course of operations the British force did not report any shortage of ammunition or fuel and other military supplies. The supplies to the troops were routed through Ascension Islands that formed an important air base and military support for the Royal forces. The British also pitched in the Merchant Navy forces to assist in the operations through supply of officers, troops, merchant ships and trawlers.
However, there were numerous technology lapses observed during this campaign such as the use of aluminium superstructure in ships increased their vulnerability to heat and fire. Ships suffered damages on account of use of aluminium that melted under intense heat or fire. The absence of AEW was yet another shortcoming that prevented warnings of impending dangers from missile launch. The Argentines failed miserably in anticipating the British response to their aggressive attack. Moreover, the poor strategic planning and ineffective use of submarines for counter attack contributed to their losses. The dominance of British sea power was visible during the campaign and the win reinforced its strengths and capabilities at conducting joint capability warfare strategies.
Lessons learnt from the joint capability in Falklands
An article Tempest in a teapot by Reginald and Eliot observes astutely that the British victory was a consequence of both military precision and luck since Argentina had the distinctive advantage of location, supplies, men, materials and air force equipment. The experience of the British military capabilities was a decisive factor in shaping the victory in Falkland campaign. At the beginning of the war Argentina had a distinctive advantage in air power but was unable to establish control over the airspace in Falkland using its fighter bombers. The British Sea Harriers were highly effective in chasing away the Argentine fighter air planes within a few days of shooting. The striking advantage of the maritime air operations in the course of this campaign was the focal point of future changes in naval operations. Commodore Steve Jermy observes in his article Maritime Air Power many lessons have been drawn from the Falklands War, but for me the success of the campaign centred on the ubiquitous presence of maritime air power able to be tasked across the full range of force protection and projection roles both over the task force and in the amphibious area of operations.
The campaign was a loss for the Argentine government in terms of political shift of powers and strained relations with United Kingdom. Besides the political repercussions the Falkland campaign marked a distinctive phase in framing of future military strategies and British defence policy. Marine warfare was the focal point in gaining military advantage of future combats and conflicts. The joint operations between land, naval and air power combine to provide an effective marine warfare strategy. This type of military operations is distinct from purely naval operations that focus on the use of naval forces only during combats. A successful marine strategy involves the efficient use of land and air forces and equipment is made during military operations. The benefits of marine strategy are felt in terms of increased mobility and flexibility in use of forces. This kind of warfare strategy is suitable for expeditionary combats where forces have to be deployed in foreign countries away from their established bases.
One of the primary lessons learnt is that early detection of security threats is instrumental in designing appropriate operational strategies and leading successful military intervention. Moreover, this helps in preventing the threat from becoming a risk and avoiding worsening situation that might get too hot to handle. Another important lesson learnt was that subsequent follow up of the situation in the area is much beneficial in ensuring that sudden flare up does not re-occur and that peace and stability is restored in the region. The institutions have also realized that limited number of troops can work wonders provided the planning and execution of operations is well defined with little or no loopholes. Another essential ingredient to successful management of such crisis is efficient and effective coordination and cooperation among the global institutions. This is a very effective means of handling any kind of global crisis ruling out any possibility of errors and mismanagement of operations. Last but not the least, flexibility in approach to new situations and new crisis is much needed since each scenario reflects varying conditions and environment in which they emerge.
A key lesson learnt during the Falklands campaign was the significance of Airborne Early Warning (AEW) in communicating impending dangers and risks to ships. The loss of Atlantic Conveyor might have been averted if the British forces had implemented an AEW mechanism in place. The use of joint capability of air and marine forces provides distinctive advantages to the military warfare. The strategic advantage lies in independence of air operations in the absence of landed air base. The carriers enable deployment of air attacks without any landed footprint thus ensuring increased flexibility and mobility of operations. Moreover, these carriers are difficult targets and hence provide increased safety in operations.
The Falklands War saw the benefits that can be derived from the proper deployment of special operations forces. Present military warfare strategies focus on launching aggressive air attacks on enemy grounds through the use of high technology missiles and deploying military and naval forces to cut off supply lines. This helps in rendering the opponent weak and in a disadvantageous position. The British defence forces have always emphasised the importance of cutting off supply routes to prevent access to food and ammunition.
Joint capability status after the campaign
The British navy during the 1980s focused on anti-submarine forces that were not equipped to face long drawn combats and engage in expeditious amphibious operations. The Argentine navy was better prepared and equipped to conduct marine warfare. The Argentines had built its fleet around the idea of being regionally dominant in the South Atlantic, and possessed a broad range of naval capabilities. It also had a distinctive advantage in a strong landed airbase that could carry Exocet anti ship missile. However, the advantage in terms of quantity of ships, forces and equipment of Argentina was lost in comparison to the superior training and professional attitude of the British. Lt Jason McClure in his article The Falkland War Causes and Lessons for Strategic Insights observes that the fact that the British won the war does not indicate their superior defence power but reflects the poor strategic planning and tactical options chosen by Argentines. However, it did demonstrate the ability and flexibility of the British armed forces to respond to unforeseen circumstances and make well planned strategic moves in contingencies.
In the Falklands it is important to remember both sides found themselves confronted by campaigns they did not expect and had to improvise with armed forces that were not designed to deal with the scenario that unfolded. Under such unforeseen circumstances the real test lay in effective command and control over the operations during the campaign. The war had been initiated by the Argentine forces in an attempt to claim their dominance in the Islands. However, the Argentine forces were forced to adopt a passive resistance to the aggressive moves of the British forces owing to their increasingly superior warfare tactics. The Argentine forces lacked the quality of manpower in command of operations that resulted in poor performance and inadequate control over the combat. The strategic moves made by the Argentines were poor in comparison to the precision and accuracy of the well planned operations by the British.
The British operations were led effectively through a clear line of control and command that ensured a precision and accuracy in planning distinctive phases of military combat. The chain of command led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Admiral Lewin and Admiral Fieldhouse was marked by a high level of understanding of the requirements and existing capabilities that was jointly used to provide a winning edge to the campaign. At the onset of the campaign the British Prime Minister considered a range of options to resolve the issue of invading Argentines in the Falklands soil. A discussion with the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and Secretary of Defence John Nott led to the despatch of the nuclear submarines to the South Atlantic with a group of destroyers to come in handy in case of contingency operations. This was followed by an aggressive invasive attack of Argentine forces on 31st March 1982 on the Falklands Islands. The British government sent a military task force to combat the attacks. The campaign was essentially dependent on naval capabilities and the focus of the Generals was to plan strategic moves based on the use of joint capabilities of air and marine forces. The Ministry of Defence procured the latest Sidewinder AIM-9L air to air missiles from the United States. Other essential military supplies were also secured from United States during the campaign and this ensured a steady supply of ammunition, fuel and other essentials. Logistics of the war played a critical role in ensuring the success of the British operations.
The British government sought the assistance of its international allies in securing more ships and arms. The War Cabinet formed during this campaign comprising of the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary Home Secretary and Chairman of the Conservative Party outlined the specific objectives of the campaign as withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands Islands and re-establishment of the British administration. Lewin and Fieldhouse worked in close cooperation to provide guidance and direction to their forces more effectively. The combined efforts of technology and development of forces through improved communication, clear lines of control and an effective command structure was important in deciding the fate of the campaign. The win over Falklands was followed by the retaking of South Georgia that ensured the British dominance over the region and a boost of morale within the forces.
The focus of British Defence Policies over the past few decades
The UK defence policy has been largely influenced by the existing political and economic environment in Europe and conflicting interests of United States. The European states face new challenges and opportunities today and changing international relations require a re-thinking of the political strategy and military strategies adopted by the institutions. Ronald Asmus, the Executive Director of the Transatlantic Centre states three reasons behind the need for this strategy revision. First and foremost, he feels is the changing interests and priority of United States post September 11 attacks. The US has shifted their focus away from Europe towards the Middle East. The reservoir of transatlantic goodwill and political capital accumulated during the 1990s has evaporated into the sands of Iraq. In Europe, the enlargement fatigue has set in thanks to stumbling institutional reforms and the mounting expense of integrating new EU members. The strained relations and the changing priorities are eroding the core ideals and principles that formed the base of such alliances like NATO, EU, and OSCE.
The second stumbling block is the new challenges facing the European states from the Balkans. This region is economically weak and politically unstable facing threats to the law and order of the countries. These countries form the new boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic community lying between unstable Middle East and hostile Russia.
The third factor that indicates rapidly changing international relations and trends is the new and emerging face of Russia. This country has emerged as a more powerful, nationalist, and less democratic entity challenging the Western powers. Moscow sees itself as an independent Eurasian power, offering its own authoritarian capitalist model of development as an alternative to democratic liberalism. The European states feel a disadvantage in handling this emerging power.
The key issues involved in meeting security challenges are military capacity, duration of operations, economic reconstruction, democratisation, and humanitarian assistance. The global organizations planning to intervene and restore peace and order in any threatened economy need to look deeply into these issues. Any operation involving risk to security and threat to the common public requires adequate military personnel to combat the law and order situation. The amount of troops required, supplies of food and ammunition is largely dependent on the estimated duration of operations. Once the law and order has been restored the next step should be economic reconstruction that involves facilitating financial aid to restore the shattered economy and pave the way for economic growth in the country.
Incorporation of lessons learnt in 1980s
The British defence policy since the First World War has focused on developing its core competencies in area of naval warfare. Technological innovation has played a critical role in empowering the nations capabilities and the budgetary spending on the acquisition of the latest missiles and submarines have increased over time. The Falklands campaign was noted for the use of British Carrier ships to accommodate Sea Harrier FRS1, RAF Harrier GR3, and anti submarine helicopters. This provided the nation with extended advantage in pursuing both air and marine warfare strategies efficiently. The Sea Harriers assisted in gaining air superiority while destroying hundreds of Argentine aircrafts during the campaign. The basic advantage of aircraft carriers is that they enable the delivery of air power from sea besides being fast, highly mobile, logistically independent, zero footprint, deployed operating bases from which manoeuvre units. Today the emphasis of the defence institutions is on research and development of new technology and equipment that improve the chances of winning a political combat.
During the 1980s in the post Falklands war period the country was engaged in the Cold War and the military budgets rose considerably in view of new missile deployment and procurement of military supplies. The government gave the green signal for the deployment of cruise missiles and procurement of American Trident missiles. The strengthening of ties with United States served to improve the global image of the British as a global power. The government placed increasing emphasis on the threats posed by increasing proliferation of nuclear missiles and growing supplies of weapons of mass destruction. The Falklands War substantiated this notion and provided an occasion on which to revive Second World War imagery and sentiments of Britishness. However, with the dismal economic conditions there were considerable cuts in the defence budgets owing to rising cost of military equipment and supplies.
The Ministry of Defence in the post war period in 1982 ordered extra Sea Harriers and Sea Kings in face of losses in aircraft during the campaign. Efforts were made to improve in-flight re-fuelling capacity to sustain longer duration air combats. The loss of four ships during the campaign was compensated by the procurement of a ninth type 22 Frigate and retention of three older DLGs (guided missile frigates) that were supposed to be phased out before the Falklands campaign. The Ministry of Defence also decided to maintain two carriers in commission and retain Invincible that was earlier decided to be sold to the Australians. The Falklands campaign hence emphasised the need for retaining older carriers since new models proved highly susceptible to damages in case of intense fire or heat conditions. The defence budget was increased to more than three percent in view of replacement of aircrafts and carriers lost during the campaign and to sustain the cost of establishing the Falklands garrison. A garrison of land, air and sea forces was deployed in the Falklands to avert any attacks in future. The ice patrol ship HMS Endurance that was earlier withdrawn from Falklands Islands was re-instated. All carrier ships were modified to accommodate improved point defences. The defence budget in the year 1983-84 was 15.973 billion of which 624 billion was allocated towards the cost of maintaining forces in Falklands.
The Falklands did result in the retention of a third Invincible class carrier but the restoration of the third carrier group was not included. The navy operated with two carriers and the third in storage. At the end of the war a fleet repair ship RFA Diligence was acquired. The HMS Triumph possessing similar capabilities was scrapped in the year 1980 in line with cuts in the defence budget. One of the significant features of the Falkland campaign was the use of aircraft carriers having short take-off and vertical landing facilities.
Constraints preventing the incorporation of lessons learnt in the 1980s
The Falklands campaign did not have a considerable or long lasting impact on the defence policies besides some improvements in the naval base and application of improved technology innovation in enhancing the joint capabilities of marine warfare. Mrs Thatchers patronage may have helped cushion the armed services in general and the Navy in particular from greater cuts but there was no major enhancement of out-of-area capability beyond that announced before the Falklands conflict. The increase in military budgets was pursued for a short period of time in the wake of the Falklands campaign. The defence cuts were back in action after a few years and the Grove Report observes that by the end of the 1980s the Navy had very few changes in comparison to its existing capacities in the beginning of 1982.
There cannot be much doubt however, that the success of the British operations in Falklands did help in lubricating the wheels of defence policy. It helped the forces gear up to future challenges and carry out successful military operations in Afghanistan and other Gulf regions. British security policies emphasised a great deal on nuclear weapons and subsequent policies were framed around the procurement of advanced technology weapons and military supplies that enhanced the nations position as a dominant global power. The Falklands campaign projected the nations power in out-of-area combats with the help of improved logistics and well-planned maritime strategies.
The British defence policy before the Falkland campaign had witnessed radical transformations in the post World War era. It had sought to balance the rising economic costs and increasing cost of military equipment and supplies. This was evident in the reduction of the size of its forces and cuts in purchase of new equipment and weapon supplies. Most of these decisions were unplanned and did not reflect an in-depth analysis of situations. The major defence reviews which implemented these adjustments at roughly five year intervals were usually hasty responses to inevitable but unpredicted clashes between escalating weapon costs and fiscal crises. The Cold War had contributed to mounting tensions and hostile global relations. This triggered the need for increasing military budgets to meet any future crisis that might arise from this Cold War. The British military forces incorporated a defence budget to meet the urgency of the situation. Andrew Dorman in his article Viewpoint The Nott Review Dispelling the Myths observes that John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defence in 1981 had taken over a defence budget that was high in terms of existing inflation and economic pressures that the country was facing. The focus of the defence policy in 1981 was maintenance of independent nuclear deterrent, defence of UK, the commitment of army and air force to defence of Germany, and the defence of North Atlantic sea routes to Europe. Under such circumstances the defence cuts were not supported by the Conservative government. As part of cut in expenses the Defence institutions considered the phasing out of some assault ships like HMS Fearless and Intrepid. However, the decision was revoked during the outbreak of the Falkland war.
The budgetary cut in the Royal Defence Forces of Britain was marked by contrasting increase in Argentine military spending. The British force was not a dominant global power during this period and hence faced a lot of adversities. As a result, when the Falkland aggression was launched by Argentine taking the British by surprise there was a lot of last minute preparations that were done by the Royal force to launch an aggressive campaign.
Impact of the war on the 1990s defence policy
The lessons learnt from the Falkland campaign emphasises the significance of wartime logistics, training, communication, technology and planning of strategies in view of existing constraints and resources in winning a war. The British defence policy since 1950s was focused on retaining and improving its position in the global political environment. Post Falkland War the country sought to improve its defence provisions through extensive research and development activities and collaborative ventures formed in mutual security interests with other European nations. An autonomous Defence Research Agency was responsible for extending infrastructural and technology support to the defence establishments. In the year 1991-92 more than 9 billion was allocated for the production of defence equipment and this phase saw an increasing self-reliance in defence research and development and production sectors.
One of the major impacts of the Falklands conflict was felt in the way Britain asserted its global supremacy and allotted more resources towards the building of defence capabilities. However, the 1980s recession forced major budgetary cuts. In the 1990s the defence policies were more focused towards achieving a balanced power in terms of maritime capabilities. The government increased budgetary allocations towards research and development activities to strengthen their amphibious operations. In the year 1994 the Ministry of Defence took the decision for the launch of a three star Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) that will be responsible for major operational command functions from the three service wings. Additionally a Joint Service Command and Staff College were established to replace the three single staff colleges along with the establishment of the Joint Services Defence College. These steps were taken to promote a unified approach to defence services and military capabilities. The British forces maintained maritime forces in various strategic locations to enable rapid deployment to combat areas. The presence of the Amphibious Ready Group in Mediterranean and the Illustrious Carrier Group in Eastern Atlantic was effective in rapid deployment of forces to Sierra Leone in the year 2000. These measures were taken in view of bringing together the armed forces at all levels of war and this included tactical, strategic and operational.
The amphibious capabilities of the British forces have assumed a new significance in the light of changing operational strategies and the capability continues to be modernized with the entry into service of the second Landing Pad Dock, HMS Bulwark, designed to embark, transport, and deploy as well as to recover troops and their equipment by air and sea and provide the headquarters for the Amphibious Assault Force. Additional carriers were procured during this period to transport supplies, troops, and their deployment via sea or air.
The last five years have seen a considerable change in the shape of the Royal Navys Fleet Air Arm (FAA) with the migration of the Commando Helicopter Force to the Joint Helicopter Command under operational command of Commander-in-Chief Land, and the move of the Sea Harrier Squadrons to 1 Group RAF. The primary objective of the FAA has been to produce and acquire highly proficient military equipment that can be carried using naval fleet to win combats. The 21st century policies have focused on increasing and improving the joint capabilities of both air and sea forces through increased sea control. The use of air attack technology through sea has made it increasingly effective for the defence forces to optimise the use of forces and equipment in expeditionary warfare.
The warfare strategies have evolved over centuries and decades to the present generation of strategic combats. The lessons learnt from each war and military operations have paved the way for new techniques in dealing with the opponents. Moreover, the role of advancing technology in contributing to high tech warfare cannot be disputed. The application of technology and information and communication tools in formulating warfare strategies have provided the military forces with increased power and scope of defence operations. War theorists believe that we have entered into a new generation of warfare where an evolved form of insurgency uses all available networks political, social, economic, military to convince the enemys decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. The fourth generation warfare as it has been referred to by academicians and theorists implies a high level of precision and intelligence strategies. Technical capabilities enable the nations to predict the movement of satellites and means of evading them. The strategic use of information and intelligence services to gain an advantage over the enemy aspirations is highly effective in lowering the morale levels of the opponent and gaining victory through sophisticated technical intelligence capabilities.
One of the vital lessons learnt from the Falklands campaign was the need for improved technology and its major contribution in quelling aggressive military moves made by the opponent. The British defence policy in the existing political environment emphasises on the need and significance of driving technological superiority to enhance military capabilities and success in combat operations. Emerging technology and innovative use of technology is vital in achieving speed, accuracy and precision in military warfare and this requires substantial investment. The Ministry of Defence has focused its energies on improving military capabilities through the growth and development of related industries that provide high class infrastructural facilities to the Defence institutions. Extensive research and development activities are a core area of focus and military budgets have been allocated fairly for supporting these areas. The effective uses of communications and information technology in areas of military expertise have assumed increased significance in the past few years. Technology watch has become a key activity, enabling us to be aware of developments in emerging fields and exploit them as the technology matures.
Since the Cold War the British forces have been continuously engaged in military operations across Europe and other parts of the world. This included the Iraqi war in 1991 and 2003 among other operations in Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland and Balkans. The impacts of these operations have been felt in the framing of subsequent defence policies and development of military capabilities. The defence policies of Britain have shifted their focus from continental warfare to maritime warfare strategies. Maritime warfare strategies combine the joint operations between naval, land and air forces and are distinct from naval strategy that focuses only on naval warfare. The publishing of the Strategic Defence Review in the year 1998 emphasised the intentions of the Labour government to shift the defence planning towards an increased capabilities based approach.
The Falklands campaign was a significant victory for the British forces and provided a chance to demonstrate its superior naval and air powers. The campaign also highlighted a new milestone in terms of use of joint capability of naval and air powers to ensure effective military operations. Many studies were undertaken to research the impact of this war on the subsequent defence policies and its implications on global warfare strategies. The Falklands War was an important watershed event that influenced subsequent British defence policy. Although its impact was not earth shattering, it nevertheless constituted a potent catalyst for change in some important aspects of the structure and emphasis in the nations defence policymaking. The Falklands War in the year 1982 triggered many distinctive changes in the defence policy of Britain. The essay focuses on the Falkland campaign and its subsequent impact on the defence policies of Britain. The subsequent sections analyse the outcomes of the war, the lessons learnt and the implications of these lessons on the defence strategies.
Campaign
Falkland Islands are separated from the Argentine mainland by only 400 miles to the Eastern coast. The distance from UK is about 8000 miles south-west. Early in the year 1690 British captain Strong landed on the islands and this was followed by the establishment of the British settlement in Falkland in the year 1776. The island was subject to several foreign invasions by France, Spain and US to be ultimately claimed as a British territory in the year 1833. Argentina laid claims on the territory on grounds of strategic interest. The island was located close to the Eastern coast of Argentina and possession of these territories would provide it with improved access to the mineral rich Antarctica in future. Oil was yet another resource that triggered Argentines interest in the islands in addition to providing an extended coastal dominance over regions of Cape Horn and Strait of Magellan. On the other hand British claimed that the people of Falkland were free and democratic gradually moving towards a system of self-governance under the British rule. The UK government emphasized that the island population wanted to remain under British dominance owing to the status quo provided by the existing governing authority. The political influences in Argentina led them to launch an attack on the Falkland territory in the year 1982. The military forces occupied the island territories despite UN resolution to withdraw forces immediately. The British responded with an aggressive campaign to ensure Argentines compliance with the UN sanctions to withdraw forces. The campaign focused on achieving this objective through UN diplomacy, economic sanctions or use of force as the last resort.
The British objectives behind the aggressive stance in the Falkland campaign were to assert its supremacy among the global powers and retain its dominance in colonial establishments. For the UK, the war was a tool of rational security policy it fought a national war over universal issues. Ignoring the attack on Falklands would have exposed its weakness in terms of economic and military capabilities. Moreover, both UK and Argentina had conflicting interests in Antarctica and a failure to react to the Argentine attack would have indicated the relinquishing of its stakes in the future developments of the continent. UK initiated moves to gain control over the island through means of political isolation, UN intervention and economic sanctions. However, when everything failed the only alternative left was to use military force.
The British operation in Falkland was carried out in three joint operation phases. The first phase of the operation was aimed at blocking Argentine Navy access to the islands through the use of nuclear submarines. In the second phase the British gained control and command over the sea and air operations that enabled them to recapture the islands through mounting amphibious landing operations. Argentina surrendered to the British on June 13 and this earmarked a new milestone in the history of naval warfare operations. The dismal performance of the Argentine troops in the war was attributed to various reasons ranging from poor planning, superior technology adopted by the opponents, and gross under-estimation of the British warfare tactics.
Joint capability status before the campaign
The end of the Cold War saw a new era in the European states that highlighted new challenges and threats to the political, social, and economic security. The Central and Eastern European states felt the need to design a framework to enable these states to coordinate their foreign policies and develop suitable measures to handle security issues. United Kingdom concentrated its efforts during this period on maintaining the freedom of its member states and expands its economic interests at various strategic locations across the globe. This goal was realized through its active participation in the formation and subsequent policies adopted by the European Union. Fundamental aspirations, and decisions about policy and posture, are framed in the light of the international environment and a nations sense of its place therein. The allocation of resources to military spending is decided on grounds of its significance in pursuing national interests and political economic gains. The interests of the British government lie in the expansion and protection of its settlements across the globe. The defence and security policies of the nation has emphasised the increasing need for maintaining a strong naval base. This is largely on account of the flexibility it affords, making it feasible to cope with whatever challenges may be presented in either the Eastern Atlantic or the more distant waters to which ships might be dispatched out of area contingency operations. Most of the European countries had inadequate naval infrastructure. The supremacy of the United Kingdom in the European integration since the historic times was based on the grounds of its well maintained and advanced naval base.
Prior to the Falklands campaign the British forces were actively engaged in forming strategic alliances for enhancing political, economic and social security through NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), EU (European Union) and OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). Both NATO and EU were effective in strengthening the position of the European States by consolidating democracy and ensuring stability from the Baltics to the Black Sea, they redrew the map of Europe. At the end of the Cold War, the OSCE played an active role in helping the European States to adopt democracy through its various regulatory bodies like the Secretariat in Vienna, Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw. The OSCE is more like a open forum where members can voice their concerns and opinions influencing policy decisions taken by the member countries since it does not have a legal binding on its members to abide by its resolution.
The NATO and the EU had been working together to meet the challenges posed to the European security. But this co-operation was bound by many conditions and pre-conditions that had led to conflicts between the associated member states and allies. A recent move by the EU was the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that was backed strongly by the United States with the pre-condition that this policy be tied to the NATO. The EU member states felt that both NATO and EU should work closely but support the ESDP since it provided the European member states to operate more autonomously in case of any crisis or conflicts without waiting for intervention or participation of the United States. During this phase there were very few military operations that were deployed outside Europe and this was a stark contrast to the conventional British Defence policy that laid increased emphasis of expeditionary warfare and extending its capabilities to operate from various geographic corners of the world.
The British defence policy during this phase focused more on naval and expeditionary forces. Conventional war tactics were applied to maintain political and military supremacy in the colonial territories. However, there were efforts to modernize the military capabilities through the acquisition of new technology and warfare equipment. Proposals were floated to improve amphibious operational capabilities that suffered setbacks in the pre-Falklands War period owing to budgetary constraints.
Use of Joint Capability during the Falkland Conflict
The Falklands campaign was a first in history owing to the use of missile technology in marine warfare. The objective of the war was limited to the assertion of political dominance over the islands of Falklands and this served to restrict the outcomes of the war in terms of territorial independence or autonomous control. The British possessed a distinctive advantage in terms of superior training and professionalism when it came to planning strategic moves and direction of the campaign. The communication between the campaign chiefs in London and generals at war front exhibited increased control over military affairs and aggressive moves. The moves were well planned, co-ordinated and executed with a precision that decided the outcome in their favour. On the other hand the level of control and command executed by the Argentines was not as effective. The strategic moves were ill-planned and this was evident in the level of mis-communication and mis-interpretation of statements during the war.
A primary contributor to the success of British forces was the adoption of high level of technology used during the warfare. The sea harriers out performed any other equipment during the course of aggression and this was demonstrated by the level of accuracy of attacks even in poor weather conditions. The use of missiles during the warfare was highly effective in destroying 8 Argentine aircrafts. During the course of operations the British force did not report any shortage of ammunition or fuel and other military supplies. The supplies to the troops were routed through Ascension Islands that formed an important air base and military support for the Royal forces. The British also pitched in the Merchant Navy forces to assist in the operations through supply of officers, troops, merchant ships and trawlers.
However, there were numerous technology lapses observed during this campaign such as the use of aluminium superstructure in ships increased their vulnerability to heat and fire. Ships suffered damages on account of use of aluminium that melted under intense heat or fire. The absence of AEW was yet another shortcoming that prevented warnings of impending dangers from missile launch. The Argentines failed miserably in anticipating the British response to their aggressive attack. Moreover, the poor strategic planning and ineffective use of submarines for counter attack contributed to their losses. The dominance of British sea power was visible during the campaign and the win reinforced its strengths and capabilities at conducting joint capability warfare strategies.
Lessons learnt from the joint capability in Falklands
An article Tempest in a teapot by Reginald and Eliot observes astutely that the British victory was a consequence of both military precision and luck since Argentina had the distinctive advantage of location, supplies, men, materials and air force equipment. The experience of the British military capabilities was a decisive factor in shaping the victory in Falkland campaign. At the beginning of the war Argentina had a distinctive advantage in air power but was unable to establish control over the airspace in Falkland using its fighter bombers. The British Sea Harriers were highly effective in chasing away the Argentine fighter air planes within a few days of shooting. The striking advantage of the maritime air operations in the course of this campaign was the focal point of future changes in naval operations. Commodore Steve Jermy observes in his article Maritime Air Power many lessons have been drawn from the Falklands War, but for me the success of the campaign centred on the ubiquitous presence of maritime air power able to be tasked across the full range of force protection and projection roles both over the task force and in the amphibious area of operations.
The campaign was a loss for the Argentine government in terms of political shift of powers and strained relations with United Kingdom. Besides the political repercussions the Falkland campaign marked a distinctive phase in framing of future military strategies and British defence policy. Marine warfare was the focal point in gaining military advantage of future combats and conflicts. The joint operations between land, naval and air power combine to provide an effective marine warfare strategy. This type of military operations is distinct from purely naval operations that focus on the use of naval forces only during combats. A successful marine strategy involves the efficient use of land and air forces and equipment is made during military operations. The benefits of marine strategy are felt in terms of increased mobility and flexibility in use of forces. This kind of warfare strategy is suitable for expeditionary combats where forces have to be deployed in foreign countries away from their established bases.
One of the primary lessons learnt is that early detection of security threats is instrumental in designing appropriate operational strategies and leading successful military intervention. Moreover, this helps in preventing the threat from becoming a risk and avoiding worsening situation that might get too hot to handle. Another important lesson learnt was that subsequent follow up of the situation in the area is much beneficial in ensuring that sudden flare up does not re-occur and that peace and stability is restored in the region. The institutions have also realized that limited number of troops can work wonders provided the planning and execution of operations is well defined with little or no loopholes. Another essential ingredient to successful management of such crisis is efficient and effective coordination and cooperation among the global institutions. This is a very effective means of handling any kind of global crisis ruling out any possibility of errors and mismanagement of operations. Last but not the least, flexibility in approach to new situations and new crisis is much needed since each scenario reflects varying conditions and environment in which they emerge.
A key lesson learnt during the Falklands campaign was the significance of Airborne Early Warning (AEW) in communicating impending dangers and risks to ships. The loss of Atlantic Conveyor might have been averted if the British forces had implemented an AEW mechanism in place. The use of joint capability of air and marine forces provides distinctive advantages to the military warfare. The strategic advantage lies in independence of air operations in the absence of landed air base. The carriers enable deployment of air attacks without any landed footprint thus ensuring increased flexibility and mobility of operations. Moreover, these carriers are difficult targets and hence provide increased safety in operations.
The Falklands War saw the benefits that can be derived from the proper deployment of special operations forces. Present military warfare strategies focus on launching aggressive air attacks on enemy grounds through the use of high technology missiles and deploying military and naval forces to cut off supply lines. This helps in rendering the opponent weak and in a disadvantageous position. The British defence forces have always emphasised the importance of cutting off supply routes to prevent access to food and ammunition.
Joint capability status after the campaign
The British navy during the 1980s focused on anti-submarine forces that were not equipped to face long drawn combats and engage in expeditious amphibious operations. The Argentine navy was better prepared and equipped to conduct marine warfare. The Argentines had built its fleet around the idea of being regionally dominant in the South Atlantic, and possessed a broad range of naval capabilities. It also had a distinctive advantage in a strong landed airbase that could carry Exocet anti ship missile. However, the advantage in terms of quantity of ships, forces and equipment of Argentina was lost in comparison to the superior training and professional attitude of the British. Lt Jason McClure in his article The Falkland War Causes and Lessons for Strategic Insights observes that the fact that the British won the war does not indicate their superior defence power but reflects the poor strategic planning and tactical options chosen by Argentines. However, it did demonstrate the ability and flexibility of the British armed forces to respond to unforeseen circumstances and make well planned strategic moves in contingencies.
In the Falklands it is important to remember both sides found themselves confronted by campaigns they did not expect and had to improvise with armed forces that were not designed to deal with the scenario that unfolded. Under such unforeseen circumstances the real test lay in effective command and control over the operations during the campaign. The war had been initiated by the Argentine forces in an attempt to claim their dominance in the Islands. However, the Argentine forces were forced to adopt a passive resistance to the aggressive moves of the British forces owing to their increasingly superior warfare tactics. The Argentine forces lacked the quality of manpower in command of operations that resulted in poor performance and inadequate control over the combat. The strategic moves made by the Argentines were poor in comparison to the precision and accuracy of the well planned operations by the British.
The British operations were led effectively through a clear line of control and command that ensured a precision and accuracy in planning distinctive phases of military combat. The chain of command led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Admiral Lewin and Admiral Fieldhouse was marked by a high level of understanding of the requirements and existing capabilities that was jointly used to provide a winning edge to the campaign. At the onset of the campaign the British Prime Minister considered a range of options to resolve the issue of invading Argentines in the Falklands soil. A discussion with the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and Secretary of Defence John Nott led to the despatch of the nuclear submarines to the South Atlantic with a group of destroyers to come in handy in case of contingency operations. This was followed by an aggressive invasive attack of Argentine forces on 31st March 1982 on the Falklands Islands. The British government sent a military task force to combat the attacks. The campaign was essentially dependent on naval capabilities and the focus of the Generals was to plan strategic moves based on the use of joint capabilities of air and marine forces. The Ministry of Defence procured the latest Sidewinder AIM-9L air to air missiles from the United States. Other essential military supplies were also secured from United States during the campaign and this ensured a steady supply of ammunition, fuel and other essentials. Logistics of the war played a critical role in ensuring the success of the British operations.
The British government sought the assistance of its international allies in securing more ships and arms. The War Cabinet formed during this campaign comprising of the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary Home Secretary and Chairman of the Conservative Party outlined the specific objectives of the campaign as withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands Islands and re-establishment of the British administration. Lewin and Fieldhouse worked in close cooperation to provide guidance and direction to their forces more effectively. The combined efforts of technology and development of forces through improved communication, clear lines of control and an effective command structure was important in deciding the fate of the campaign. The win over Falklands was followed by the retaking of South Georgia that ensured the British dominance over the region and a boost of morale within the forces.
The focus of British Defence Policies over the past few decades
The UK defence policy has been largely influenced by the existing political and economic environment in Europe and conflicting interests of United States. The European states face new challenges and opportunities today and changing international relations require a re-thinking of the political strategy and military strategies adopted by the institutions. Ronald Asmus, the Executive Director of the Transatlantic Centre states three reasons behind the need for this strategy revision. First and foremost, he feels is the changing interests and priority of United States post September 11 attacks. The US has shifted their focus away from Europe towards the Middle East. The reservoir of transatlantic goodwill and political capital accumulated during the 1990s has evaporated into the sands of Iraq. In Europe, the enlargement fatigue has set in thanks to stumbling institutional reforms and the mounting expense of integrating new EU members. The strained relations and the changing priorities are eroding the core ideals and principles that formed the base of such alliances like NATO, EU, and OSCE.
The second stumbling block is the new challenges facing the European states from the Balkans. This region is economically weak and politically unstable facing threats to the law and order of the countries. These countries form the new boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic community lying between unstable Middle East and hostile Russia.
The third factor that indicates rapidly changing international relations and trends is the new and emerging face of Russia. This country has emerged as a more powerful, nationalist, and less democratic entity challenging the Western powers. Moscow sees itself as an independent Eurasian power, offering its own authoritarian capitalist model of development as an alternative to democratic liberalism. The European states feel a disadvantage in handling this emerging power.
The key issues involved in meeting security challenges are military capacity, duration of operations, economic reconstruction, democratisation, and humanitarian assistance. The global organizations planning to intervene and restore peace and order in any threatened economy need to look deeply into these issues. Any operation involving risk to security and threat to the common public requires adequate military personnel to combat the law and order situation. The amount of troops required, supplies of food and ammunition is largely dependent on the estimated duration of operations. Once the law and order has been restored the next step should be economic reconstruction that involves facilitating financial aid to restore the shattered economy and pave the way for economic growth in the country.
Incorporation of lessons learnt in 1980s
The British defence policy since the First World War has focused on developing its core competencies in area of naval warfare. Technological innovation has played a critical role in empowering the nations capabilities and the budgetary spending on the acquisition of the latest missiles and submarines have increased over time. The Falklands campaign was noted for the use of British Carrier ships to accommodate Sea Harrier FRS1, RAF Harrier GR3, and anti submarine helicopters. This provided the nation with extended advantage in pursuing both air and marine warfare strategies efficiently. The Sea Harriers assisted in gaining air superiority while destroying hundreds of Argentine aircrafts during the campaign. The basic advantage of aircraft carriers is that they enable the delivery of air power from sea besides being fast, highly mobile, logistically independent, zero footprint, deployed operating bases from which manoeuvre units. Today the emphasis of the defence institutions is on research and development of new technology and equipment that improve the chances of winning a political combat.
During the 1980s in the post Falklands war period the country was engaged in the Cold War and the military budgets rose considerably in view of new missile deployment and procurement of military supplies. The government gave the green signal for the deployment of cruise missiles and procurement of American Trident missiles. The strengthening of ties with United States served to improve the global image of the British as a global power. The government placed increasing emphasis on the threats posed by increasing proliferation of nuclear missiles and growing supplies of weapons of mass destruction. The Falklands War substantiated this notion and provided an occasion on which to revive Second World War imagery and sentiments of Britishness. However, with the dismal economic conditions there were considerable cuts in the defence budgets owing to rising cost of military equipment and supplies.
The Ministry of Defence in the post war period in 1982 ordered extra Sea Harriers and Sea Kings in face of losses in aircraft during the campaign. Efforts were made to improve in-flight re-fuelling capacity to sustain longer duration air combats. The loss of four ships during the campaign was compensated by the procurement of a ninth type 22 Frigate and retention of three older DLGs (guided missile frigates) that were supposed to be phased out before the Falklands campaign. The Ministry of Defence also decided to maintain two carriers in commission and retain Invincible that was earlier decided to be sold to the Australians. The Falklands campaign hence emphasised the need for retaining older carriers since new models proved highly susceptible to damages in case of intense fire or heat conditions. The defence budget was increased to more than three percent in view of replacement of aircrafts and carriers lost during the campaign and to sustain the cost of establishing the Falklands garrison. A garrison of land, air and sea forces was deployed in the Falklands to avert any attacks in future. The ice patrol ship HMS Endurance that was earlier withdrawn from Falklands Islands was re-instated. All carrier ships were modified to accommodate improved point defences. The defence budget in the year 1983-84 was 15.973 billion of which 624 billion was allocated towards the cost of maintaining forces in Falklands.
The Falklands did result in the retention of a third Invincible class carrier but the restoration of the third carrier group was not included. The navy operated with two carriers and the third in storage. At the end of the war a fleet repair ship RFA Diligence was acquired. The HMS Triumph possessing similar capabilities was scrapped in the year 1980 in line with cuts in the defence budget. One of the significant features of the Falkland campaign was the use of aircraft carriers having short take-off and vertical landing facilities.
Constraints preventing the incorporation of lessons learnt in the 1980s
The Falklands campaign did not have a considerable or long lasting impact on the defence policies besides some improvements in the naval base and application of improved technology innovation in enhancing the joint capabilities of marine warfare. Mrs Thatchers patronage may have helped cushion the armed services in general and the Navy in particular from greater cuts but there was no major enhancement of out-of-area capability beyond that announced before the Falklands conflict. The increase in military budgets was pursued for a short period of time in the wake of the Falklands campaign. The defence cuts were back in action after a few years and the Grove Report observes that by the end of the 1980s the Navy had very few changes in comparison to its existing capacities in the beginning of 1982.
There cannot be much doubt however, that the success of the British operations in Falklands did help in lubricating the wheels of defence policy. It helped the forces gear up to future challenges and carry out successful military operations in Afghanistan and other Gulf regions. British security policies emphasised a great deal on nuclear weapons and subsequent policies were framed around the procurement of advanced technology weapons and military supplies that enhanced the nations position as a dominant global power. The Falklands campaign projected the nations power in out-of-area combats with the help of improved logistics and well-planned maritime strategies.
The British defence policy before the Falkland campaign had witnessed radical transformations in the post World War era. It had sought to balance the rising economic costs and increasing cost of military equipment and supplies. This was evident in the reduction of the size of its forces and cuts in purchase of new equipment and weapon supplies. Most of these decisions were unplanned and did not reflect an in-depth analysis of situations. The major defence reviews which implemented these adjustments at roughly five year intervals were usually hasty responses to inevitable but unpredicted clashes between escalating weapon costs and fiscal crises. The Cold War had contributed to mounting tensions and hostile global relations. This triggered the need for increasing military budgets to meet any future crisis that might arise from this Cold War. The British military forces incorporated a defence budget to meet the urgency of the situation. Andrew Dorman in his article Viewpoint The Nott Review Dispelling the Myths observes that John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defence in 1981 had taken over a defence budget that was high in terms of existing inflation and economic pressures that the country was facing. The focus of the defence policy in 1981 was maintenance of independent nuclear deterrent, defence of UK, the commitment of army and air force to defence of Germany, and the defence of North Atlantic sea routes to Europe. Under such circumstances the defence cuts were not supported by the Conservative government. As part of cut in expenses the Defence institutions considered the phasing out of some assault ships like HMS Fearless and Intrepid. However, the decision was revoked during the outbreak of the Falkland war.
The budgetary cut in the Royal Defence Forces of Britain was marked by contrasting increase in Argentine military spending. The British force was not a dominant global power during this period and hence faced a lot of adversities. As a result, when the Falkland aggression was launched by Argentine taking the British by surprise there was a lot of last minute preparations that were done by the Royal force to launch an aggressive campaign.
Impact of the war on the 1990s defence policy
The lessons learnt from the Falkland campaign emphasises the significance of wartime logistics, training, communication, technology and planning of strategies in view of existing constraints and resources in winning a war. The British defence policy since 1950s was focused on retaining and improving its position in the global political environment. Post Falkland War the country sought to improve its defence provisions through extensive research and development activities and collaborative ventures formed in mutual security interests with other European nations. An autonomous Defence Research Agency was responsible for extending infrastructural and technology support to the defence establishments. In the year 1991-92 more than 9 billion was allocated for the production of defence equipment and this phase saw an increasing self-reliance in defence research and development and production sectors.
One of the major impacts of the Falklands conflict was felt in the way Britain asserted its global supremacy and allotted more resources towards the building of defence capabilities. However, the 1980s recession forced major budgetary cuts. In the 1990s the defence policies were more focused towards achieving a balanced power in terms of maritime capabilities. The government increased budgetary allocations towards research and development activities to strengthen their amphibious operations. In the year 1994 the Ministry of Defence took the decision for the launch of a three star Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) that will be responsible for major operational command functions from the three service wings. Additionally a Joint Service Command and Staff College were established to replace the three single staff colleges along with the establishment of the Joint Services Defence College. These steps were taken to promote a unified approach to defence services and military capabilities. The British forces maintained maritime forces in various strategic locations to enable rapid deployment to combat areas. The presence of the Amphibious Ready Group in Mediterranean and the Illustrious Carrier Group in Eastern Atlantic was effective in rapid deployment of forces to Sierra Leone in the year 2000. These measures were taken in view of bringing together the armed forces at all levels of war and this included tactical, strategic and operational.
The amphibious capabilities of the British forces have assumed a new significance in the light of changing operational strategies and the capability continues to be modernized with the entry into service of the second Landing Pad Dock, HMS Bulwark, designed to embark, transport, and deploy as well as to recover troops and their equipment by air and sea and provide the headquarters for the Amphibious Assault Force. Additional carriers were procured during this period to transport supplies, troops, and their deployment via sea or air.
The last five years have seen a considerable change in the shape of the Royal Navys Fleet Air Arm (FAA) with the migration of the Commando Helicopter Force to the Joint Helicopter Command under operational command of Commander-in-Chief Land, and the move of the Sea Harrier Squadrons to 1 Group RAF. The primary objective of the FAA has been to produce and acquire highly proficient military equipment that can be carried using naval fleet to win combats. The 21st century policies have focused on increasing and improving the joint capabilities of both air and sea forces through increased sea control. The use of air attack technology through sea has made it increasingly effective for the defence forces to optimise the use of forces and equipment in expeditionary warfare.
The warfare strategies have evolved over centuries and decades to the present generation of strategic combats. The lessons learnt from each war and military operations have paved the way for new techniques in dealing with the opponents. Moreover, the role of advancing technology in contributing to high tech warfare cannot be disputed. The application of technology and information and communication tools in formulating warfare strategies have provided the military forces with increased power and scope of defence operations. War theorists believe that we have entered into a new generation of warfare where an evolved form of insurgency uses all available networks political, social, economic, military to convince the enemys decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. The fourth generation warfare as it has been referred to by academicians and theorists implies a high level of precision and intelligence strategies. Technical capabilities enable the nations to predict the movement of satellites and means of evading them. The strategic use of information and intelligence services to gain an advantage over the enemy aspirations is highly effective in lowering the morale levels of the opponent and gaining victory through sophisticated technical intelligence capabilities.
One of the vital lessons learnt from the Falklands campaign was the need for improved technology and its major contribution in quelling aggressive military moves made by the opponent. The British defence policy in the existing political environment emphasises on the need and significance of driving technological superiority to enhance military capabilities and success in combat operations. Emerging technology and innovative use of technology is vital in achieving speed, accuracy and precision in military warfare and this requires substantial investment. The Ministry of Defence has focused its energies on improving military capabilities through the growth and development of related industries that provide high class infrastructural facilities to the Defence institutions. Extensive research and development activities are a core area of focus and military budgets have been allocated fairly for supporting these areas. The effective uses of communications and information technology in areas of military expertise have assumed increased significance in the past few years. Technology watch has become a key activity, enabling us to be aware of developments in emerging fields and exploit them as the technology matures.
Since the Cold War the British forces have been continuously engaged in military operations across Europe and other parts of the world. This included the Iraqi war in 1991 and 2003 among other operations in Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland and Balkans. The impacts of these operations have been felt in the framing of subsequent defence policies and development of military capabilities. The defence policies of Britain have shifted their focus from continental warfare to maritime warfare strategies. Maritime warfare strategies combine the joint operations between naval, land and air forces and are distinct from naval strategy that focuses only on naval warfare. The publishing of the Strategic Defence Review in the year 1998 emphasised the intentions of the Labour government to shift the defence planning towards an increased capabilities based approach.
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